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Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion 1
Alexander Broadie
Introduction
Last	year	was	the	300th	birthday	of	David	Hume.	Very	old!	But	he	is	
also	very	young	and	over	the	many	years	I	have	been	reading	Hume,	
I	have	met	people	who	have	learned	from	him,	despite	his	age!	Every	
time	I	come	to	the	text	I	learn	from	him.	
Where	does	he	stand	on	religious	matters?	Some	people	think	he	
was	a	deist,	some	that	he	was	an	agnostic,	some	that	he	was	a	sceptic,	
and	some	that	he	was	an	outright	atheist.	Well,	I	guess	they	can’t	all	be	
wrong	completely	about	this,	but	what	is	so	impressive	is	that	across	
the	 whole	 of	 the	 European	 Enlightenment	 he	 was	 one	 of	 the	 two	
greatest	writers	within	philosophy	of	religion	and	theology.	I	conclude	
that	if	the	majority	opinion	is	right	and	that	Hume	does	not	believe	in	
God,	then	you	don’t	need	to	believe	in	God	to	be	a	good	theologian.	It	
actually	helps	not	being	a	believer	in	God	from	one	important	point	of	
view,	for	it	means	you	can	step	back	and	have	a	slightly	more	distant	
and	therefore	more	objective	perspective	of	the	scenery.
The	fact	that	some	people	say	he	was	a	deist,	some	that	he	was	a	
sceptic,	some	that	he	was	agnostic	and	some	that	he	was	an	atheist,	
suggests	that	there	is	a	certain	lack	of	clarity	somewhere.	The	obvious	
thing	is	to	say	is	that	the	lack	of	clarity	is	in	the	text.	Actually	I	don’t	
think	the	text	lacks	clarity.	I	think	that	it	is	plain	as	a	pikestaff	where	
Hume	stands	on	the	matter	of	God’s	existence	and	that	there	is	a	lack	
of	clarity	in	a	number	of	the	commentators	who	are	bringing	various	
agendas	and	partis	pris	to	work	on	their	interpretation.	What	you	get	
isn’t	so	much	an	account	of	Hume	as	an	account	of	the	interpreter.	
So	let	me	start	by	saying	that	Hume	had	something	to	say	about	
religion	in	one	of	his	very	earliest	writings,	an	extant	letter	written	at	
a	 time	when	he	was	 having	 something	 approximating	 to	 a	 nervous	
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breakdown.	To	the	end	of	his	days	he	was	still	thinking	about	religion,	
worrying	about	 it,	writing	even	on	his	deathbed	about	religion.	The	
very	 last	 things	 he	 was	 working	 on	 were	 finishing	 touches	 to	 his	
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.	That	is	not	really	to	say	he	
finished	the	book	but	to	say	instead	that	the	book	ended	when	he	died.	
So	here’s	a	man	who	does	not	stand	at	a	great	distance	from	religion.	
For	whether	he	said	‘yes’	to	it	or	‘no’	to	it	he	was	thinking	about	it	all	
the	time	and	probably	gave	it	a	lot	more	thought	than	do	many	people	
who	are	profoundly	religious.
What	I	shall	do	in	this	lecture	is	to	talk	to	you	about	where	I	think	
he	stands	on	the	fundamental	question	of	religion	–	that	concerning	
the	existence	of	God.	
Hume	had	a	two-pronged	attack	on	the	question.	He	distinguishes	
early	in	his	career	between	two	distinct	problems	which	can	easily	be	
confused.	One	of	them	is	the	nature	of	the	process	of	belief	formation:	
How	 do	 we	 fetch	 up	 with	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 God?	 The	
other	 question	 is:	How	 can	we	 demonstrate	 that	God	 exists?	Now,	
these	two	questions	are	profoundly	different	in	respect	of	the	sort	of	
methodology	 one	would	 use	 to	 approach	 them,	 because	 a	 question	
about	belief	formation,	why	a	belief	occurs	 to	you	or	how	it	comes	
to	occur	to	you,	is	first	and	foremost	a	psychological	question.	Why	
do	people	fetch	up	believing	in	God?	We	find	all	sorts	of	very	strange	
accounts,	a	 lot	of	 them	nothing	to	do	with	reason	or	 intellect.	 It’s	a	
quite	 separate	question	 from	whether	we	can	demonstrate	 that	God	
exists.	
Hume’s writings
Hume	wrote	two	extended	works	on	religion,	one	called	The Natural 
History of Religion and	 the	 other	 Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion.	One	of	 the	 things	 that	 these	 two	titles	have	 in	common	is	
the	word	‘natural’	and	here	I	take	my	starting	point	from	something	
that	 Prof	 Stewart	 Sutherland	 was	 saying	 earlier,	 in	 what	 I	 thought	
was	a	marvelous	lecture.	That	is,	that	Hume	approached	things	from	
the	point	of	view	of	a	natural	scientist.	We	start	from	where	we	are.	
We	are	natural	creatures	living	in	the	natural	world	which	we	access	
through	the	exercise	of	our	natural	faculties	–	the	various	senses	and	
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so	on.	We	think	about	the	world	on	the	basis	of	ideas	that	have	come	
to	us	through	our	experience	of	the	natural	world.	Hume	is	going	to	
start	where	he	feels	about	as	secure	as	he	feels	anywhere	and	that	is	
experience,	 the	undeniable	experience	of	 the	world	 that	he	 lives	 in,	
and	he’s	going	to	approach	questions	about	religion	from	where	he	is,	
a	natural	creature	in	the	natural	world.	
This	 is	 his	 subject	 throughout	 his	 life.	 His	 magnum opus,	
philosophically	speaking,	is	his	Treatise of Human Nature.	We’ve	got	
to	 listen	 to	 that	 title.	Human	nature.	Why	 is	 he	on	 about	 that?	The	
answer	is	that	he	thinks	that	human	beings	are	natural	beings.	We	are	
parts	 of	 nature	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 investigate	 human	
beings	using	a	methodology	that	is	appropriate	for	the	investigation	
of	nature.	Let’s	say	with	Hume,	that	human	beings	are	an	appropriate	
object	for	natural	scientific	investigation.	If	we	look	around	the	world	
we	 discover	 all	 over	 the	 place	 human	 beings	with	 religion	 so	 let’s	
consider	 religion	 also	 as	 part	 of	 the	 natural	 world,	 part	 of	 human	
practices	 and	human	beliefs.	 In	 all	 of	 this	we	want	 to	 know,	 given	
that	 these	 human	 beliefs	 are	 part	 of	 our	 nature,	 just	 how	 did	 they	
come	to	be	formed	in	us?	I	don’t	want	to	go	into	any	of	the	details	
regarding	his	answer,	I	just	want	to	say	that	he	engaged	in	an	exercise	
which	was	known	during	the	period	of	the	Scottish	Enlightenment	as	
conjectural	history.	One	investigates	the	beginnings	of	things,	the	real	
origins	of	things	that	are	so	far	back	that	there	is	no	historical	evidence	
at	all.	Examples	might	be:	What	is	the	origin	of	government?	What	
is	 the	origin	of	society?	What	 is	 the	origin	of	 language?	Hume	was	
interested	in	the	origin	of	religion.	
A natural study of religion
As	there	are	no	texts	available	contemporary	with	the	beginnings	of	
religion,	what	we’ve	got	to	do	is	something	else.	What	we	have	to	do	
is	construct	as	detailed	an	account	of	human	nature	as	we	possibly	can	
and	ask:	Since	this	is	what	human	beings	are	like,	how	would	human	
beings	be	in	the	most	primitive	circumstances	we	can	imagine	human	
beings	 in?	So	Hume	puts	his	 thoughts,	developed	 in	 the	Treatise of 
Human Nature,	 to	 work	 on	 matters	 to	 do	 with	 religion.	 He	 wrote	
his	Natural History of Religion	 about	 one	 decade	 after	writing	 the	
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Treatise of Human Nature so he	knew	about	human	beings	and	now	
sets	himself	to	ask	about	the	early	origins	of	religious	belief.	He	gives	
an	account	in	terms	of	human	fear	because	in	those	earliest	primitive	
days	human	beings	were	even	less	able	to	deal	with	the	catastrophes	
of	nature	than	we	are	today.	Put	it	this	way,	we	are	still	pathetic	and	
hopeless	in	many	circumstances	but	we	are	better	able	to	deal	with,	
say,	the	savagery	of	animals	than	people	once	were.	
Origin of religion stemming from fear
Where	 we	 live	 in	 fear,	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 that	 Hume	 noticed	
amongst	people	to	personify	things.	There	is	a	category	of	rhetoric	–	
prosopopoeia –	 the	rhetorical	figure	of	personification,	and	he	says,	
this	is	the	way	we	look	at	a	cloud,	or	a	cloud	formation	and	we	see	
someone	standing	or	sitting	on	a	horse	or	something	of	this	sort,	the	
way	we	see	a	face	in	the	moon.	This	is	prosopopoeia – personification.	
We look	at	 the	great	 things	in	nature,	water	sources,	fire	and	so	on,	
and	we	start	personifying	the	elements	and	think,	‘Sometimes	they	do	
terrible	things	to	us’.	Since	we	tend	to	personify	we	start	to	think,	‘If	
this	is	doing	something	so	terrible	to	us	maybe	it	is	being	malevolent	
towards	us,	in	which	case	we	have	to	respond	as	best	we	can.	Do	we	
know	how	to	propitiate	 it?’	Gradually	there	forms	an	idea	of	spirits	
and	Hume	 thought	 that	naturalism	in	 that	sense,	spirits	 in	nature	or	
animism,	was	the	early	origin	of	religion	and	it	was	polytheistic	and	
was	grounded	in	fear.	He	thought	that	religion	began	with	fear	and	it	
developed	with	fear.	All	the	things	associated	with	religion	–	such	he	
called	priestcraft	–	began	with	mountebanks	and	charlatans	coming	
along	with	the	secret	of	how	to	propitiate	the	spirits;	they	were	a	class	
of	 people	 with	 specialist	 knowledge	 on	 how	 to	 propitiate.	 This	 is	
Hume’s	story.	There	is	a	lot	to	be	said	in	favour	of	this	and	things	to	be	
said	against	it.	However,	I	am	just	wanting	to	say	this	is	the	Humean	
story	of	how	religion	started	and	it	is	a	totally	naturalistic	story	and	
that	is	the	crucial	thing	about	it.
We	might	want	to	tinker	with	the	details	or	give	a	radically	different	
story.	 For	 example,	 there	 is	 someone	 coming	 to	 lecture	 in	 a	 few	
months	time	at	the	University	of	Glasgow	who	will	be	speaking	about	
theistic	belief	on	the	basis	of	neuroscience.	There	is	now	something	
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called	neuro-theology	which	is	hard	at	work.	It	suggests	 that	 if	you	
stimulate	 certain	 nodal	 points	 in	 the	 brain	 you	 get	 religious	 belief.	
This	in	fact	is	a	version	of	where	Hume	is	at,	that	is	to	say	we	fetch	
up	with	religious	belief	and	the	question	is:	Can	we	give	a	naturalistic	
account	of	how	we	come	by	that	belief?	And	suppose	we	can	give	a	
naturalistic	account,	what	do	we	say	about	that?	
Well,	there’s	one	thing	I	want	to	say	about	that.	When	I	was	young	
there	was	a	particular	story	about	the	strength	of	religion	that	was	doing	
the	rounds	in	which	it	was	argued	that	fundamentally	religion	has	got	
to	be	right	because	belief	in	it	is	almost	universal.	This	was	known	in	
my	early	days	as	the	kerygmatic	argument	for	the	existence	of	God.	If	
you’ve	got	a	belief	that	is	nearly	universal	this	does	suggest	there	has	
got	to	be	something	to	it.	Hume	doesn’t	deny	that	but	the	question	is:	
What	is	there	to	it?	Does	it	follow	that	it	is	true?	The	answer	is	‘no’.	
What	 follows	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 an	almost	universal	belief,	
he	felt,	is	that	there	is	some	mechanism	almost	universally	placed	in	
the	human	psyche	or	in	the	human	brain	even,	which	prompts	us	into	
having	certain	beliefs.	The	fact	that	we’ve	got	these	beliefs	does	not	in	
the	least	mean	that	the	beliefs	are	true;	it	means	that	is	the	conclusion	
you	may	have	to	draw	if	you	start	off	as	a	natural	scientist	raising	the	
question	about	what	the	natural	origin	of	belief	in	God	might	be.	
What is the question?
It	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	the	proposition	that	God	exists	is	not	
true.	What	I’m	saying	is	that	the	question	‘How	does	the	belief	come	
to	be	formed	in	our	heads?’	is	totally	irrelevant	to	the	question	‘Does	
God	exist?’	You	can	produce	 the	human	story	about	how	the	belief	
forms,	whether	it’s	a	story	from	neurology	about	how	belief	forms,	or	
from	any	number	of	other	sources,	but	they	say	nothing	at	all	about	
the	 intellectual	 underpinning	 that	 you	 would	 require.	 Hume	 knew	
that	very	well	and	no	doubt	 thought,	as	 I	do,	 that	 there	 is	probably	
hardly	a	soul	on	this	planet	who	believes	in	God	because	they’ve	read	
Anselm	of	Canterbury’s	Proslogion	(his	ontological	argument	about	
the	existence	of	God)	and	said	 to	 themselves,	 ‘Wow,	 that’s	a	 really	
valid	argument!	I	can’t	help	believing	in	God	as	of	now.’	I	bet	not	a	
soul	came	to	believe	in	God	via	Anselm’s	argument	for	the	existence	
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of	God.	As	a	matter	of	fact	we	know	that	not	even	Anselm	came	to	
believe	 in	 the	 existence	 of	God	 because	 of	 this	 argument,	 since	 he	
precedes	 the	argument	with	a	prayer	 to	God.	This	 is	fides quaerens 
intellectum,	 faith	seeking	understanding.	 It	 is	on	 the	basis	of	 this	 in	
fact	that	I	am	myself	wishing	to	argue.	Far	from	anybody	coming	to	
believe	Anselm’s	argument	for	the	existence	of	God,	Anselm	doesn’t	
actually	have	an	argument	for	the	existence	of	God.	That’s	not	what	
he	is	trying	to	do.	What	he	is	trying	to	do	is	understand	God	by	way	
of	an	argument,	otherwise	it	doesn’t	make	much	sense	to	say,	as	he	
does,	 ‘Oh	God,	please	give	me	understanding	so	 that	 I	may	deepen	
my	faith.’	That	doesn’t	sound	like	a	prelude	to	an	argument.	This	is	a	
man	who	is	as	far	from	needing	an	argument	for	the	existence	of	God	
as	anyone	could	be.	Like	everybody	who	does	believe	in	God,	perhaps	
we	want	to	pause	for	a	minute	to	wonder	for	a	minute	what	we	actually	
do	believe.	What	is	the	content?	What	is	this	God?	What	is	the	modus 
essendi?	What	is	the	mode	of	being	of	the	being	who	is	God?
Mechanisms
So,	to	stay	for	a	moment	with	Anselm,	we	begin	by	thinking	of	the	God	
that	exists.	We	therefore	have	an	idea	of	God	in	our	mind.	Because	I	
say	God	exists	and	I’ve	got	some	idea	of	God,	God	cannot	exist	only	
in	my	mind;	because	I	think	of	God	as	perfect,	and	if	God	only	exists	
in	my	mind	he	cannot	be	perfect,	so	he	must	have	being	that	is	external	
to	me	as	well	as	internal.	But	not	external	being	like	mine.	My	being	is	
a	contingent	being,	his	must	be	a	being	of	such	a	nature	that	he	cannot	
not be.	Anselm	goes	deeper	and	deeper	until	he	ends	up	with,	not	a	
belief	in	God	as	previously,	but	with	a	deeper	understanding	of	what	
he	was	assenting	to	in	faith.
Let’s	make	a	distinction	here	between	coming	to	believe	in	God	by	
some	naturalistic	route	and	knowing	an	argument	for	the	existence	of	
God,	and	let’s	recognise	that	merely	understanding	the	psychological	
mechanism	 involved	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 belief	 goes	 nowhere	
near	 answering	 why	 one	 ought	 to	 believe	 or	 what	 the	 intellectual	
justification	is	for	the	belief.	
Can	you	give	a	justification?	Hume,	as	a	philosopher,	is	interested	
in	that	question	of	intellectual	justification.	He	says,	the	mere	fact	that	
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more	or	less	everybody	believes	doesn’t	mean	that	it	is	true,	so	I	am	
now	asking	as	a	separate	question:	Why	should	we	believe	it,	if	the	
fact	that	everybody	believes	is	not	itself	an	argument?
Round	about	the	time	Hume	started	work	on	the	Natural History 
of Religion	(we	are	not	absolutely	sure	of	the	dates	but	it	was	possibly	
around	1749–50	–	it	was	eventually	published	in	1757)	he	set	to	work	
on	 his	 religious	magnum opus,	 his	Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion,	which	is	without	peer	amongst	writings	on	religion	during	
the	 European	 Enlightenment	 (not	 just	 the	 Scottish	 Enlightenment).	
I	 think	the	only	person	that	comes	anywhere	near	him	is	Immanuel	
Kant.	
The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
There’s	something	post-modern	about	the	Dialogues.	There	are	three	
personae	there,	talking	about	religion	and	the	existence	of	God:	there	
is	Philo	who	is	a	careless	sceptic;	Cleanthes,	who	I	fondly	think	of	as	a	
moderate	clergyman,	who	is	described	at	the	beginning	as	an	accurate	
philosopher;	 and	Demea	who	 is	 described	 as	 rigidly	 orthodox.	The	
word	used	of	Demea	is	‘inflexible’.	This	information	comes	before	the	
Dialogues	start.	The	Dialogues	are	the	content	of	a	letter	that	a	young	
man	named	Pamphilus	wrote	to	Hermippus.	All	of	this	is	important	for	
a	certain	reason.	Pamphilus	wrote	to	Hermippus	to	say	that	the	previous	
day	he	had	been	listening	to	a	most	interesting	conversation	which	he	
was	 sure	Hermippus	would	be	 interested	 in.	Clearly	Pamphilus	has	
a	good	memory	because	he	then	proceeds	to	write	a	hundred	pages,	
and	with	very	dense	 argumentation.	He	 says	modestly,	 it’s	 the	best	
he	 can	do!	Who	are	 these	people?	We	don’t	 know	 too	much	 about	
that	but	we	learn	almost	at	the	start	of	the	Dialogues	that	Pamphilus	
is	 the	 tutee	 of	 the	moderate	 theologian/clergyman,	 Cleanthes.	 It	 is	
Pamphilus	who	 says	 that	 Cleanthes	 is	 an	 accurate	 philosopher	 and	
complains	about	the	other	two	because	one	is	careless	and	the	other	is	
inflexible.	You	might	think	this	is	a	biased	source,	a	tutee	staying	on	
the	right	side	of	his	tutor.	But	what	I	want	to	point	out	is	that	Hume	
was	anticipating	trouble.	There	were	a	number	of	folk,	mostly	clergy,	
who	were	not	at	all	happy	about	what	Hume	had	to	say,	indeed	some	
of	them	were	downright	hostile.	Stewart	Sutherland	reminded	us	that	
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Hume	applied	for	the	Chair	of	Moral	Philosophy	in	Edinburgh	in	1745	
and	was	 rejected.	 It	was	 not	 the	 town	 council	 but	 very	 largely	 the	
committee	of	clergyman	who	stopped	him	in	his	tracks.	Hume	knew	
that	he	was	going	to	have	trouble	with	some	members	of	the	clergy	as	
they	had	already	shown	what	they	were	capable	of:	having	prevented	
his	appointment	to	the	Edinburgh	Chair,	they	shortly	afterwards	again	
stopped	him	in	his	 tracks	when	he	went	for	 the	Logic	and	Rhetoric	
Chair	at	Glasgow.
Now,	 the	 drift	 of	 the	 argument	 in	 the	Dialogues	 is	 not	 a	 very	
agreeable	one	 from	 the	point	of	view	of	 a	 certain	kind	of	 religious	
person.	One	of	 the	personae	 in	 the	Dialogues	 is	 really	 speaking	on	
behalf	 of	Hume	 –	 that’s	 Philo.	But	 Philo	 doesn’t	 declare	 this;	 he’s	
just	one	of	 the	three	characters.	But	the	point	 is,	 if	anybody	attacks	
Hume	because	of	something	that	is	said	in	the	Dialogues,	Hume	can	
reply	‘Why	do	you	ascribe	that	view	to	me?	It	is	in	the	mouth	of	either	
Demea	or	Cleanthes	or	Philo	and	they	are	all	disagreeing	with	each	
other.	Why	do	you	 think	 this	one	 is	me?’	And	what’s	more,	having	
established	 the	 enormous	 distance	 between	 himself	 and	 the	 text	 of	
the	 dialogue,	Hume	 can	 go	 one	 stage	 further	 –	 it’s	 not	 that	we	 are	
getting	 the	 actual	 text	 that	 came	 from	 their	mouths,	we	 are	 getting	
the	memory	of	it	that	the	tutee	of	one	of	the	participants	wrote	for	a	
pal	of	his!	So	 it’s	Pamphilus’s	memory,	and	Hume	might	even	say,	
‘Well	Pamphilus	was	mis-remembering	anyway,	so	it’s	not	 just	 that	
this	doesn’t	represent	my	view,	maybe	this	wasn’t	said	at	all.’	Hume	
has	placed	himself	at	maximum	distance	so	no	one	can	attack	him.	
Nobody	was	 taken	 in	 by	 this	 because	 it	was	 difficult	 to	 forget	 that	
Hume	 had	 actually	 written	 the	 book.	 Even	 if	 you	 can’t	 precisely	
ascribe	a	particular	view	to	Hume,	 the	fact	 is	 that	 there	 is	one	drift	
of	argument,	one	particular	line	that	people	would	not	like	and	it	was	
brilliantly	 argued,	 so	whether	 it	 was	 held	 by	Hume	 or	 not	 he	was	
giving	 the	best	argument	 to	 the	devil.	 It	might	have	been	better	 for	
Hume	if	he	had	toned	it	down	a	little	bit.	
I	 am	 reminded	 of	 something	 that	 Thomas	Aquinas	 said	 in	 the	
Summa Theologia about	disputes	the	church	occasionally	sets	up	with	
folk.	 If	 you	 do	 set	 up	 a	 dispute	with	 somebody	 in	 a	 different	 faith	
community,	set	it	up	in	such	terms	that	you	will	win,	because	if	you	
lose	you	might	set	at	risk	the	faith	of	 the	faithful.	Better	 to	give	no	
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argument	at	all	than	a	bad	argument	or	even	a	good	argument	that	can	
be	trumped	by	another	argument	that	is	even	better.	So	whether	or	not	
Hume’s	arguments	are	really	strong	or	in	the	end	they	are	not	valid,	if	
they	are	persuasive	then	for	the	sake	of	the	faithful	they	are	better	not	
said,	because	at	the	end	of	the	day	something	of	sovereign	value	is	at	
risk,	namely	salvation,	somebody’s	immortal	soul.	So	you’ve	got	to	
be	careful	here.	One	well	understands	the	strength	of	the	attitude	of	
some	of	the	Kirk	ministers.	Well,	Hume	couldn’t	care	less	about	the	
strength	of	the	position	on	the	other	side.	The	question	was,	how	good	
were	their	arguments?
He	comes	clean	quite	early	on,	 in	 that	 the	 three	protagonists	all	
agree	 that	 there	 is	 no	 point	 looking	 at	 a priori arguments	 for	 the	
existence	 of	 God	 (arguments	 that	 do	 without	 experience,	 such	 as	
Anselm’s	 argument	 that	 if	 you	 have	 an	 idea	 of	 God	 in	 your	mind	
you	can	conclude	 that	 there	must	be,	outside	your	mind,	something	
corresponding	to	the	idea	inside	your	mind).	The	grounds	for	rejecting	
such	arguments	don’t	matter	at	the	moment.	The	point	is	that	that	they	
are	rejected	with	very	little	discussion	in	the	course	of	the	Dialogues.	
In	that	case	what	are	we	left	with?	
An orderly created world?
We	are	 left	with	what	 I	began	with,	which	 is	 the	 fact	 that	Hume	 is	
approaching	all	of	this	from	where	he	is,	namely	a	creature,	a	human	
being,	 a	 piece	 of	 nature	 using	his	 sensory	 receptors	 to	 look	out	 on	
the	natural	world	and	see	what	we	can	 learn	about	 the	existence	of	
God.	The	Dialogues	 is	 a	 text,	 therefore,	 placed	 very	 firmly	within	
the	European	tradition	of	natural	theology	which	depends	heavily	on	
the	work	of	scientists,	 in	the	sense	that	you	argue	that	 if	 indeed	the	
natural	world	is	the	work	of	a	Creator,	an	artificer	God,	a	God	who	
made	 this	world,	 then	God	must	have	 left	his	fingerprints	on	 it.	He	
must	have	put	something	of	himself	into	the	world	that	he	created	so	
that	it	is	not	just	a	natural	world,	eternally	separate	from	him,	but	a	
creatum	in	eternal	relation	to	the	Creator.	In	that	case	an	appropriately	
slanted	investigation	of	this	creatum	will	reveal	marks	of	the	Creator,	
somehow	or	 other.	 It	was	 thought	 in	 particular	 that	 since	 a	 natural	
being	was	investigating	nature	by	the	use	of	his	natural	faculties	then	
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natural	science	was	what	he	was	doing.	Understood	from	a	Humean	
perspective,	the	science	of	man	is	one	way	of	doing	natural	science.	
When	 the	 natural	 scientist	 turns	 his	 gaze	 upon	human	beings	 he	 is	
doing	natural	science	and	the	science	is	the	science	of	man	and	it’s	for	
this	reason	that	the	methodology	that	was	developed	by	Francis	Bacon	
(the	Baconian	method)	that	was	taken	up	by	Newton	was	immediately	
appropriated	by	theologians	as	well.	Here	was	a	brilliantly	successful	
method	of	observation	and	experimentation.	They	thought,	‘It	works	
for	all	other	parts	of	the	natural	world,	we	are	part	of	the	natural	world,	
it	should	work	for	us	too.’	Therefore	Hume	approached	his	theological	
goal	in	his	capacity	as	a	natural	scientist	in	the	same	sense	in	which	
Bacon	was	a	natural	scientist	and	in	the	same	sense	in	which	Newton	
was	 a	 natural	 scientist.	There	was	 therefore	 no	 divide	 between	 the	
science	 of	man	 and	 the	 natural	 science	 of	Newton,	 not,	 at	 least,	 in	
respect	of	the	methodology	of	the	natural	sciences.	
So	Hume	looks	round	and	he	sees	an	orderly	world	and	he	raises	
questions	about	it.	He	wonders	whether	the	cosmos	can	be	understood	
to	have	the	marks	of	design,	marks	of	an	artificer	in	the	way	a	human	
artefact	has.	We	have	only	to	look	at	a	watch	to	know	that	it	isn’t	a	bit	
of	plant	life;	it	took	intelligence	to	make	it,	it	is	not	an	organism.	You	
can’t	give	an	account	of	the	origin	of	a	watch	in	the	same	terms	as	you	
give	an	account	of	the	origin	of	a	piece	of	seaweed	or	dandelion	or	a	
piece	of	 rock.	This	 is	human	intelligence,	human	thought;	someone	
thinking	teleologically	went	to	work	on	this.	It’s	plain	that	the	watch	
is	made	to	tell	the	time.	In	that	case	why	don’t	we	say,	‘Is	it	not	plain	
that	as	a	watch	is	made	to	tell	the	time,	so	the	eye	is	made	to	see?’	If	
we	are	going	to	be	teleological	is	it	not	in	biology	and	botany	you	find	
teleologies	as	clearly	as	anywhere?	What	other	reason	could	there	be	
for	this	particular	chemical	configuration	if	not	to	reproduce	a	certain	
outcome?	
Hume	agrees	that	teleology	works	very	well	when	we	are	talking	
about	the	human	being	–	we	make	plans,	we	have	intentions,	these	are	
our	goals	and	much	of	what	we	do	is	done	in	relation	to	goals	we	have	
set	ourselves.	Our	behaviour	is	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	something	
that	 lies	not	so	much	in	 the	behaviour	as	beyond	it	 in	 the	outcome.	
The	outcome	is	only	in	the	behaviour,	but	the	outcome	is	somewhat	
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beyond	the	behaviour	which	is	being	engaged	in,	in	order	to	produce	
a	certain	result.	Hume,	however,	has	pages	of	argument	against	this.	
Made in God’s image?
To	begin	with,	Hume	doesn’t	like	the	speed	with	which	the	theologians	
have	moved	from	talk	about	human	beings	and	their	plans	and	their	
intentions	to	talk	about	a	divine	artificer.	The	argument	from	analogy	
is	very	tricky	to	handle.	Let’s	say	there’s	some	very	vague	analogy,	
but	then	what	are	we	talking	about?	We	look	out	on	our	world,	about	
which,	I	have	to	say,	it	seems	we	know	almost	nothing.	We	look	out	on	
a	tiny	little	fragment	of	it,	and	that’s	all	we’ve	got.	We	have	no	reason	
to	believe	that	what	we	are	seeing	is	all	there	is.	What	we	are	seeing,	in	
fact,	is	almost	nothing	of	the	natural	world,	only	some	tiny	little	corner	
of	a	minute	fragment	and	for	a	brief	period	of	time.	Let	us	therefore	
note	 that	 there	may	be	 infinite	ways	 of	 producing	 things	 by	 nature	
of	which	we	know	only	one	or	two	or	three.	We	know	some	ways	of	
producing	things	for	they	are	ways	that	we	use.	But	why	should	we	
suppose	that	we	are	so	important	in	the	universe	that	we	provide	the	
model,	even	an	imperfect	model,	of	the	Creator	of	the	Cosmos?	What	
impertinence	on	our	part!	Who	knows	what	extraordinary	ways	there	
may	be	of	producing	things,	ways	that	we	with	our	brain	limitations	
could	not	get	our	minds	around?	Let’s	go	easy	on	the	whole	matter	of	
human	beings	as	an	analogy	or	as	a	rhetorical	figure	for	God.	
This	 is	 the	drift	of	Hume’s	argument	against	 analogy	especially	
as	we	 have	 to	 remember	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 human	 artefacts	 is	
based	upon	a	vast	amount	of	experience.	Consider	houses;	we	watch	
them	being	built.	When	we	come	across	a	house	we	don’t	say,	‘What	
on	earth	is	that	doing	there?	How	an	earth	did	that	come	to	be?’	We	
watch	people	build	houses	and	we’ve	had	ample	experience,	and	if	we	
want	we	can	watch	 the	watchmaker	making	watches	–	so	we	know	
about	the	process	from	the	start.	This	is	the	natural	scientific	approach.	
He	observes	what	is	within	the	bounds	of	experience.	So	we	can	talk	
about	human	creativity	on	the	basis	of	personal	experience.	But	when	
we	 are	 talking	 about	 the	 creation	of	 the	world,	who	was	 around	 to	
observe	that?	On	the	basis	of	what	experience?	What	evidence	do	we	
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have	of	the	creation	of	the	world?	In	a	related	context	Hume	famously	
remarked	 that	 the	wise	man	 proportions	 his	 belief	 to	 the	 evidence.	
We’ve	 really	 got	 no	 evidence	 about	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 world.	We	
weren’t	there.	Nobody	was	there	and	nobody	told	us	about	this.	We’ve	
got	 no	 idea	 how	 such	 a	 thing	was	 done	 or	what	 indeed	was	 done.	
What	does	creation	from	nothing	mean?	I	will	not	go	into	the	question	
of	whether	creation	ex nihilo is	a	biblical	concept	but	 the	 idea	of	a	
creation	ex nihilo	seems	to	have	been	taken	on	board	in	some	special	
way.	I’m	dubious	about	it	myself,	but	creation	ex nihilo seems	to	have	
been	taken	on	as	what	the	Bible	teaches.	All	I’m	saying,	along	with	
Hume,	is	that	if	we	are	going	to	be	natural	scientists	then	we	have	to	
remain	silent	on	this	because	we	haven’t	got	the	evidence.	
The fact of ‘evil’
So	 here’s	 Hume	 speaking	 as	 a	 natural	 scientist	 saying,	 ‘We	 have	
no	 experience	 about	 this	 but	 this	 is	 a	 metaphysical	 matter	 about	
God	as	Creator.’	But	 there	 is	something	else	worrying	him,	namely	
that	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Holy	 Scripture	 God	 is	 being	 accepted	 as	 just,	
forgiving,	merciful,	loving,	a	God	who	is	providential,	watching	over	
his	 creatures;	 and	 Hume	 says	 ‘Let’s	 have	 some	 evidence.’	 God	 is	
perfectly	good,	God	 is	omnipotent.	However,	granted	 that	 there	are	
evil	things	in	the	world,	how	might	we	explain	these	away	and	still	be	
left	with	a	workable	concept	of	the	perfectly	good	God?	Hume	is	not	
looking	at	it	from	that	point	of	view.	Hume	is	looking	at	it	from	the	
point	of	view	of	a	natural	scientist	who	starts	with	his	mind	clear	of	
belief	in	the	existence	of	God.	He	looks	out	on	the	natural	world	and	
wonders	whether	the	evidence	he	finds	would	give	him	good	reason	to	
believe	that	there	is	an	omni-benevolent	God.	So	he	is	not	starting	off	
by	believing	in	an	omni-benevolent	God	and	then	saying,	‘How	do	we	
deal	with	the	fact	of	evil?’	He’s	starting	from	the	fact	of	evil	and	saying,	
‘Since	there	is	evil	here,	how	do	I	get	from	the	fact	of	evil	to	belief	
in	an	omni-benevolent	God?’	He’s	starting	from	the	opposite	position	
to	most	theologians	who	are	already	granting	the	benevolence	of	God	
and	then	seeing	evil	as	a	problem.	From	Hume’s	perspective,	belief	in	
evil	is	no	less	an	obstacle	to	coming	to	believe	in	an	omni-benevolent	
God.	It	is	not	enough	to	say	that	‘most	of	what’s	around	is	good’,	and	
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concluding	that	‘since	there’s	more	good	than	evil	God	must	be	a	good	
God.’	No,	if	God	is	omnipotent	and	he’s	also	omni-benevolent,	there	
would	not	be	an	iota	of	evil	in	the	world.	Hume	is	saying	that	there	is	
a	very	strong	argument,	an	overwhelming	argument,	 in	his	opinion,	
that	even	if	God	exists	there	is	not	any	evidence	at	all	that	God	is	a	
morally	good	God,	a	providential	God	watching	over	and	taking	care	
of	his	children	as	a	shepherd	his	flock.	
Human artefacts linked to human intelligence in the universe?
Let	me	 return	 to	 a	matter	 raised	 earlier,	 that	 of	 the	 argument	 from	
analogy	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 God.	 Does	 Hume	 absolutely	 reject	
analogy?	I	believe	the	answer	is	‘no’	and	my	argument	is	based	on	the	
assumption	 that	Philo	 in	 the	Dialogues is	Hume’s	adopted	persona.	
Writing	on	his	deathbed	and	surely	picking	his	words	as	carefully	as	
anyone	could,	Hume	affirms	that	the	cause	or	causes	of	order	in	the	
universe	probably	bear	some	remote	analogy	to	human	intelligence.	
So	 he	 is	 not	 denying	 analogy	 outright.	 I’m	 inclined	 to	 think	 that,	
having	allowed	that	there	is	an	analogical	relationship	between	human	
artefacts	 and	 the	 cosmos	 he	 then	 qualifies	 this	 so	 comprehensively	
that	you	may	wonder	what	on	earth	this	analogy	could	be.	What	I’m	
saying	is	that	he’s	stepping	back,	he’s	distancing	himself.	He	refuses	
in	the	persona	of	Philo	to	say	that	there	is	absolutely	no	analogy.	So	
where	does	this	leave	us?	
Leaving the question open
Hume	doesn’t	say	there	is	an	analogy	and	he	doesn’t	say	there	isn’t,	
but	he’s	leaving	it	open.	However,	he	does	make	it	quite	clear	that	it	
needs	to	be	left	open	because	with	our	frail	reason	we	cannot	settle	
the	question.	So	where	are	we	with	this	argument?	I	want	to	remind	
you	 that	Hume	was	a	cradle	Calvinist.	His	 father	died	when	Hume	
was	very	young,	two	years	old,	and	his	mother,	a	dedicated	Calvinist,	
brought	 him	up	with	 his	 siblings.	He	knew	what	 the	Kirk	 of	 those	
days	 stood	 for,	 not	 to	mention	 that	many	 of	 his	 truly	 close	 friends	
during	the	Enlightenment	were	dedicated	churchman	–	one	thinks	for	
example	of	Hugh	Blair	who	occupied	the	pulpit	of	the	High	Kirk	of	St	
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Giles	for	forty-odd	years	(as	well	as	being	the	first	Professor	of	Belles	
Lettres	at	Edinburgh).	I	think	there’s	some	Calvinism	that	Hume	took	
with	him	throughout	his	life	and	I	think	he	was	deliberately	leaving	
the	door	open.	Calvinism,	if	I	may	so	put	it,	is	a	rather	broad	church	
and	within	it	there	is	an	element	which	I	would	say	was	quite	strongly	
fideistic.	What	I	am	speaking	about	here	is	that	we	can	distinguish	two	
of	the	great	faculties	of	the	human	mind,	the	faculty	of	intellect	and	
the	faculty	of	will.	
During	 the	 High	 Middle	 Ages	 onwards	 the	 Dominicans	 were	
distinguished	from	the	Franciscans	on	the	grounds	that	the	Dominicans	
said	 that	 intellect	 had	 primacy	 in	 relation	 to	will.	 The	 Franciscans	
said	that	it	was	the	will	that	had	primacy	in	relation	to	the	intellect.	
What	 this	amounts	 to	crucially	 is	 that	both	sides	believed	 that	 faith	
included	a	movement	of	the	intellect	and	a	movement	of	the	will,	and	
one	of	 these	 two	had	primacy.	The	hard-headed	fideists	 said	 ‘Faith	
is	 by	 a	movement	 of	 the	will’.	Nobody	was	 ever	 saved	 by	 a	 good	
argument.	Reason	isn’t	going	to	get	you	there,	so	it	is	not	just	Hume	
who	thinks	that	reason	can’t	deliver;	fideists	agree	with	him	on	this	
matter,	believing	as	they	do	that	it	is	the	will	that	does	the	work.	
If	you	take	 the	Humean	line	of	 the	frailty	of	reason	you	are	not	
necessarily	 arguing	 against	 Calvin,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 against	 certain	
particular	interpretations	of	Calvin.	Indeed	Calvinists	may	well	assume	
that	Hume	is	on	their	side.	In	using	one’s	intellect	people	are	running	
a	risk	because	of	the	damage	of	the	Fall.	It	is	not	that	the	Fall	caused	
the	damage,	the	Fall	was	the	damage	being	done,	the	corruption	of	the	
human	mind,	the	corruption	of	the	intellect	being	part	of	that.
An atheist or a sceptic?
Hume	is	no	more	able	to	demonstrate	the	non-existence	of	God	than	
he	 is	able	 to	demonstrate	 the	existence	of	God.	 In	 so	 far	as	he	 is	a	
natural	 scientist,	 Hume	 does	 not	 know	 that	 God	 doesn’t	 exist.	Yet	
we	are	talking	about	one	of	the	profoundest	philosophers	of	Western	
culture,	one	who	held	 that	 the	faculty	of	reason	has	a	natural	home	
in	 a	 natural	world	 and	 becomes	 less	 and	 less	 competent	 to	 answer	
questions	the	further	questions	get	from	the	natural	world.	But	if,	in	
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the	end,	Hume	can	no	more	prove	that	God	does	not	exist	than	prove	
that	he	does,	atheism	is	not	an	intellectually	sound	option.	That’s	to	
say	Hume	might	 still	be	an	atheist	but	 if	he	 is	he	 is	an	atheist	as	a	
dogma.	But	 the	evidence	better	supports	 the	contention	 that	he	was	
a	 sceptic:	not	 saying	yes	 to	God	but	not	 saying	no.	 In	 this,	he	was	
acting	as	a	wise	man	proportioning	his	belief	to	the	way	that	he	read	
the	evidence.	Few	people,	however,	take	that	from	their	reading	of	the	
Dialogues. 
Conclusion
On	 this	 basis	 I	 want	 to	 make	 one	 last	 point.	A	 lot	 of	 criticism	 of	
the	Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion	 is	 based	 upon	 a	 false	
conception	 of	what	 the	 book	 is	 about.	The	 peculiar	 thing	 is	 that	 if	
you	read	that	book	you	discover	that	Hume	is	not	discussing	whether	
God	exists.	Hume’s	question	is	whether	there	are	any	good	arguments	
for	 the	existence	of	God	and	he	 says	 that	 so	 far	 as	he	knows	 there	
aren’t	any.	But	to	say	there	are	no	good	arguments	for	the	existence	
of	God	is	not	at	all	to	say	that	God	does	not	exist.	It’s	just	to	say	that	
reason	cannot	deliver	on	that	particular	question.	So	is	he	turning	his	
back	on	religion?	No.	We	can	believe	by	a	movement	of	the	intellect	
constructing	an	argument	and	assenting	to	the	conclusion,	but	we	can	
also	believe	by	a	movement	of	the	will.	That	latter	is	a	fideistic move	
and	it	is	certainly	a	move	sanctioned	by	some	parts	of	the	Calvinist	
community.	Hume	failed	to	find	good	arguments	for	the	existence	of	
God	but	did	not	at	all	close	down	the	possibility	that	God	does	actually	
exist.	
I	don’t	see	how	you	can	call	that	an	atheistic	position.	I	agree	that	
he	was	 not	 a	 theist.	But	 he	 is	 not	 denying	 a	 deistic	God,	 for	 he	 is	
allowing	the	probability	of	a	remote	analogy	between	the	cosmos	and	
the	human	artefact.	I	think	it	is	best	simply	to	say	that	Hume	was	no	
theist,	no	atheist.	He	was	a	very	sophisticated	and	very	subtle	sceptic	
on	matters	of	religion.
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Note
1	 This	paper	a	lightly	edited	version	of	an	unscripted	talk	given	at	a	
meeting	of	the	Scottish	Church	Theological	Society	on	10.01.2012.
